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RECENT BOOKS
BOOK REVIEWS
LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. By Durga Das Basu.
Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar & Sons (Private) Ltd. 1972. Pp. xx.vi, 575.

For those who have at least a passing acquaintance with Indian
constitutional literature, Dr. Basu needs no introduction. He ranks
as one of the leading authorities on the Indian Constitution and the
whole of Indian constitutional law. His writings have not only been
influential in systematizing the body of Indian constitutional law but
have also had an important impact on the course of decisions in that
area. His pioneer commentary on the Constitution of India was itself an extraordinary work of seminal importance.1 While he has
distinguished himself as an academician, his experience in the field
of public law has been very rich and extensive. He has served as a
member of the Law Commission of India, a judge of the High Court
of Calcutta, Dean and a member of the Faculty of Law at Calcutta
University, and, more recently, Tagore Law Professor at the University of Calcutta. The book under review is based on the Tagore Law
Lectures, delivered by the author at the University of Calcutta in
1968-1969.
This volume can be said to be a distillate of Dr. Basu's ripe scholarship, insights, and wisdom on the general subject of constitutionalism. It is an interesting and skillful amalgam of several features. In
the first place, the author is intent on demonstrating a universality
of ideas concerning limited government and its necessary adjunct,
judicial review; in doing so, he draws upon his wide learning to
present each matter in its comparative aspects. Recognizing the distinctive contributions made by American constitutional theory and
practice to the concept of limited government and to the role that
judicial review plays in giving flesh and blood to the written document, he draws heavily on constitutional development in the United
States. His expertise in and knowledge of American constitutional
law and the course of American decisions is, indeed, impressive. He
also draws heavily on English constitutional practice to contrast systems that recognize an unlimited parliamentary power with those
that recognize that Parliament, as well as other organs of government,
is subject to a constitution interpreted by the courts. The book is
valuable alone for its comparative aspect.
The volume also affords very valuable insights into, and in this
sense is a limited commentary on, judicial interpretation of the Indian Constitution. The author reveals his extraordinary intimacy
l, D.
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with the decisions of the Supreme Court of India and also his great
skill in analysis of cases, synthesis of materials, and formulation of
doctrine. Dr. Basu is always forthright and clear in stating his ideas
and does not hesitate to condemn what he regards as erroneous views
or holdings by the Court.
In these lectures Dr. Basu is not primarily concerned with the systematic exposition of constitutional law; rather, he is interested in
the significance of the decisions of the Supreme Court of India for
basic constitutional concepts. The book is a treatise that transcends
empiric study of judicial interpretation and penetrates to what Dr.
Basu considers to be fundamental ideas with respect to human society and the nature of government, the idea of limited government,
the concepts of natural law and natural right, and the source of constituent power in a constitutional system. In this book Dr. Basu reveals himself to be not only a distinguished commentator on the
Indian Constitution and a scholar greatly versed in the bodies of
decisional law in various countries, but also a thoughtful jurist and
legal philosopher.
A word may be said about Dr. Basu's method, which I have described as comparative in character. Perhaps he has given us a clue
to what may really be the most effective way in which to treat materials comparatively-that is, by centering on the constitutional structure and interpretations of one particular country, but analysing and
appraising them in the light of developments under other systems.
The reader emerges with a very good picture of the Indian constitutional system as it is related to other systems and of the extent to
which it has built on the American system in particular; at the same
time, the reader gains a clear understanding of the difference benv-een
a system of limited government reinforced by judicial review, like
the system found in India, and the unlimited parliamentary power
of the English system. The book may well suggest a pattern for comparative treatment in other areas.
Within the limited scope of this book review it is not possible to
do full justice to the work. At most one can attempt to portray the
general theme of the several lectures and point out some particularly
interesting ideas as they relate to a comparison between the Indian
and American constitutional systems.
In the first lecture, with its intriguing title, "The Correct Approach" (pp. 1-43), the author sets forth some threshold ideas, which
he regards as particularly important for his Indian readers. At the
outset he makes the point that the Indian courts should make no
apology for drawing on American experience and decisions in interpreting provisions of ~e Indian Constitution, since the underlying
philosophy and many express features of the Indian Constitution
are based on the .American experience-notably, of course, the ide~
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of judicial review, the federal structure, and the enumeration of
fundamental rights.
It is evident that the author has a devotion to constitutionalism,
judicial review, and the idea of limited government, as well as a very
high respect for the Indian Constitution in particular, and he ex•
presses regret that this respect is apparently not shared by all of his
fellow citizens. He is disturbed by the relative ease with which the
Indian Constitution is amended and by the fact that it has been
amended so frequently during its relatively short history, as compared with the less frequent amendments of the United States Constition over a longer period of time. He admonishes his fellow citizens
to respect the courts as guardians of the Constitution. He suggests
alternative methods for selecting judges and notes the importance of
paying adequate judicial salaries to attract to the bench persons with
the superior ability necessary for dealing with constitutional questions.
In the next chapter, "The Problem of Power and Need for Limitations" (pp. 44-68), the author gets to the heart of the basic ideas that
he intends to develop. The problem is one of limiting governmental
power. Pointing out that the experience in England merely transferred power from a "single-headed Leviathan to a hydra-headed uncrowned Leviathan" (p. 44), namely, the Parliament, he says that
even a representative legislature is capable of abusing its power.
Judicial review is also necessary because legislative bodies, as well as
executive agencies, are capable of arbitrary and ruthless action at the
expense of the liberties of the people, and it is not an answer simply
to say that abuse of power by the legislature can be corrected by
throwing the rascals out at the next election. The reader becomes
aware early in the book that the author has strong convictions about
judicial review and that there is not the least bit of doubt in his mind
that judicial review is a good thing. He accepts the American ideas
that the constitution is fundamental law, that as fundamental law it
ranks superior to all other laws, and that in the end the judiciary's
peculiar function is to interpret the constitution and therefore give
it the final authoritative exposition. He does not see this as a violation
of the principle of separation of powers or as a betrayal of the democratic system. In India it is unnecessary to engage in extended arguments in support of judicial review, since the Indian Constitution
makes it clear that the courts are intended to exercise that function
and that any law that is found to be in violation of the Constitution
is void.
In the third lecture, "The Written Constitution as a Limitation°
(pp. 69-149), the author builds on ideas developed in the second lecture and, to some extent, anticipates ideas developed again in a later
lecture on fundamental rights. He here develops the thesis of the
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·written constitution as a superior law and, in tum, traces the concept of a superior law to its basic roots in what he regards as universal
natural-law theories. While the main emphasis in this lecture is on
the idea that the ·written constitution is a legal document that requires authoritative exposition by a judicial tribunal, the author also
develops some limitations on judicial review, notably with respect
to so-called nonjusticiable problems. His treatment of nonjusticiability follows from the point, which he emphasizes, that the courts of
India have no general power to declare legislation invalid but possess
only a power to deal with constitutional questions in the course of
justiciable controversies coming before the' courts. A major part of
the chapter consists of a very useful review of the kinds of questions
that are nonjusticiable under the Indian Constitution, eiili:er because
of express indication in the Constitution that the final determination
of the question is reserved to other branches of the government or
because nonjusticiability is implicit in the very nature of the problem.
In the fourth lecture, "Fundamental Rights as a Limitation" (pp.
150-215), the author gets to what is probably a favorite theme-that
a principal function of a constitution is to protect the rights of a person against the arbitrary exercise of power. In his view, the whole
concept of fundamental rights flows from basic natural-rights theories.
He credits Blackstone for importing the doctrine of natural rights
from the realm of political philosophy into the realm of jurisprudence, traces the early development of the natural-rights theory in
American constitutional thought, and observes that even after the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution-a
development that could be viewed as a positive incorporation of natural rights--the doctrines of natural law and natural rights continued
to wield a potent force in the judicial protection of individual rights.
This discussion leads Dr. Basu to the question of whether a specific
constitutional formulation of certain rights excludes the judicial
recognition of other rights. In this connection, he relies on American
experience to support the idea, formally expressed in the ninth
amendment to the United States Constitution, that the express enunciation of some rights does not exclude others, which are retained
by the people. Thus, he points to the recognition by the United States
Supreme Court of the freedom of association,2 the right to educate
a child in nonpublic schools of the parents' choice,3 and the right of
privacy.4 (I£ the book had been ·written later, Dr. Basu could have
referred to the recent abortion decisions by the Supreme Court5 as
2. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
4. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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a further development of the right of privacy.) At this point the
author engages in a critical discussion of the Indian decisions interpreting article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which provides that
no person "shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law." Pointing out that the
earlier Indian decisions gave a very restricted interpretation to article
21, Dr. Basu is happy with later cases that have construed it more
broadly and have used it in a way very similar to that in which the
due process clause in the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution has been used to protect substantive liberty and as a
basis for rights related to those expressly enunciated. He advances
the thesis that various aspects of privacy as developed in American
decisions could be developed under article 21 of the Indian Constitution, although he recognizes that, at least under some of the past
decisions of the Indian Court, the reasonableness of any restriction
could not be questioned.
The fifth lecture, "Due Process Under the Constitution of India"
(pp. 216-74), is of particular interest to American readers because of
the extraordinary history of interpretation of the American due
process clause, particularly after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment. In American constitutional doctrine, due process not
only refers to procedural regularity but has also come to have a substantive content in that it operates as a restraint on the arbitrary
exercise of power. The drafters of the Indian Constitution carefully
avoided using the "due process of law" language in their Constitution
and instead provided in article 21 that no person should be "deprived
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." On their face, these words have reference only to procedural due process, and Dr. Basu acknowledges this. However, he
points out that the opportunity was open to the Indian courts to develop the basic concept of substantive due process in interpreting
other provisions of the Constitution. The Indian Court has, in fact,
done this, so that while there is no formal due process clause and no
formal acceptance of the idea that the Court is free to write new
conceptions of fundamental rights into the Constitution by use of
due process language, a process that has been much criticized in
American jurisprudence, the Court has nevertheless borrowed the
basic notion that power must be exercised in only a limited way un•
less the constitutional language makes clear that the legislative power
is to be free from any restriction of reasonableness.
It is in this connection that Dr. Basu discusses the American notion of the police power, which he says was invented by American
courts to reconcile the differences between liberty, on the one hand,
and the need for legislation to secure important public objectives,
on the other. Dr. Basu maintains that, although there is no formal ac-
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ceptance of the idea in India, by its interpretation of "reasonableness," the Indian Court has, in effect, also used police power thinking.
Even with his enthusiasm for judicial review and for the power
of the court to declare invalid legislation that it finds to be unreasonable or arbitrary, Dr. Basu still takes pause when he considers the
decisions by the Indian Supreme Court in the field of legislation providing for the expropriation of property. He is particularly disturbed
by the Bank Nationalization Case,6 in which he found that the Supreme Court of India in effect incorporated tµe whole notion of substantive due process as a limitation on the eminent domain power.
He thinks that in this situation the Indian Court carried substantive
due process even further than the American courts, and he is not
happy about this. Noting that the United States Supreme Court has,
for all practical purposes, abandoned substantive due process in the
protection of property and economic rights and kept it intact only
with respect to the protection of other rights, Dr. Basu recognizes
that the Indian Constitution leaves no place for the idea of preferred
rights or for distinctions between the degrees of judicial protection
accorded the various rights explicitly protected by the Constitution.
After all that is ·written in prior chapters, the separate chapter on
"Judicial Review" (Lecture VI, pp. 275-348) simply seems to repeat
what has been said earlier, and, in part, it does. The author points
out the differences between the American system, where judicial review is implied from the nature of the constitution as superior law
and the function of the Court to interpret the law, and the Indian
situation, where judicial review is expressly recognized and the power
of the Court to declare legislation void is made explicit in the Constitution. In spite of this explicit recognition of the doctrine, the author
finds it useful to present arguments in favor of judicial review both
to justify its inclusion in the Constitution and to support a vigorous
exercise of the power. He takes the occasion here to point out that
the Court, in exercising judicial review, should deal only with the
express language of the Constitution and should not include certain
a priori assumptions that may distort constitutional interpretation.
Thus, he questions the wisdom of incorporating the ideas developed
by the United States Supreme Court in applying the supremacy clause
to invalidate state legislation found to impinge on interstate commerce, since the situation in India, where concurrent powers are expressly recognized in the Constitution, is quite different. He also
warns against reading into the constitutional section on expropriation
of property the idea of just compensation found in the American
Constitution, since the property provision in the Indian Constitution
was addressed to a totally different situation. Despite parliamentary
efforts through constitutional amendment to make it clear that the
6. Cooper v. Union of India, All India R, 1970 S. Ct. 564,
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courts are not to question the compensation formula, the Indian
Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the idea that "compensation" as used in the Indian Constitution means "just compensation"
in accordance with the American idea. In Dr. Basu's view this is a
limitation that the Indian Supreme Court has mistakenly written
into the Constitution.
In the seventh lecture, "Interpretation of a Constitution" (pp.
349-422), the author emphasizes the necessity of interpreting a constitution as a constitution and not as a statutory instrument, and he
points to what he regards as weaknesses in the perspectives brought
to constitutional interpretation by the Privy Council and the Canadian Supreme Court. He notes that the experience of Indian judges,
"trained in deciding cases on private law, while interpreting the Constitution with its Bill of Rights and avenues of Judicial Review, has
in some cases, been similar to that of the Privy Councillors dealing
·with constitutional questions coming from the Dominions" (p. 362).
It took some time for the Indian Supreme Court to realize that there
was something wrong in the cautious attitude toward judicial power
expressed in Gopalan v. Madras. 7 The Supreme Court of India has
now proceeded to the point of interpreting the term "personal liberty" in article 21 of the Constitution as broadly as the word "liberty"
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution is understood by the United States Supreme Court. Dr. Basu
points out how, in other respects, the Court has expressed its realization that an exclusively legalistic and textual interpretation would
do injustice to the Constitution. Interpretation must be progressive,
not static. Because of the gr~at detail of the Indian Constitution,
there is less room for the kind of extensive and progressive interpretation that has taken place under the broader and more indeterminate
language of the United States Constitution. Moreover, since the process of amending the Indian Constitution is easy, progressive judicial
interpretation is not nearly as important in India as it is under the
United States Constitution. Dr. Basu points out that the Indian
Constitution does contain some general terms that can be given either
expanded or narrow construction.
The important questions of "Effects of Unconstitutionality and
Prospective Overruling" are examined in the eighth lecture (pp. 42397). Express provisions of the Indian Constitution make it clear that
a declaration by the Supreme Court that a statute is unconstitutional
invalidates the statute and that this decision is binding on all other
courts; in a very real sense, the Indian decision operates in rem on a
statute, whereas the American decision operates only in personam
between the parties, and any further unenforceability of a statute depends upon the doctrine of precedent rather than upon any notion
that the statute is no longer in effect. Dr. Basu is skeptical of the
7. All India R. 1950 S. Ct. 27.
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American doctrine, developed in Linkletter v. Walker,8 that a decision announcing a new rule of constitutional law may, depending
on the circumstances, be given prospective effect only. He feels that
this result is impossible under the Indian Constitution and that, in
any event, the doctrine is undesirable and a distortion of the concept
of judicial review. One need not accept all of Dr. Basu's criticisms.
Quite clearly, the possible consequences of making a new procedural
decision retroactive so as to give the benefit of collateral attack to
prisoners in jail, which could result in wholesale voiding of convictions and the impossibility of conducting new trials because of the
staleness of evidence, are very important, and a court need not close
its eyes to these policy considerations in exercising its power of review.
In the ninth, and final, chapter, the author discusses "Amendability of the Constitution and Judicial Review of Amendment Acts"
(pp. 498-559). Dr. Basu quite rightly closes the book with a lecture
on the amendment process, a factor not always fully appreciated in
discussions of judicial review, although the whole significance of judicial review depends on the rigidity of the amendment process. If
the amendment process is laborious, a court may feel an obligation
to keep the constitution up to date by assuming an activist role,
whereas a court in a country where the amendment process is fairly
easy can take a more relaxed attitude and be content to follow precedent much more closely. The author clearly articulates the difference
between legislative power and what he calls the constitutive power,
that is, the basic power on which the constitution rests. Dr. Basu rejects the idea that the constitutive power can be asserted by the people only through a revolution outside the formal process. Amendment
procedures may be more or less flexible. In a constitution, the people, who are the source of constitutive power, may provide that the
power resides elsewhere for amendment purposes, or they may provide for an amendment process in which they play a part through
referendum. The Indian procedure is quite flexible, since it requires
no referendum, but only a special majority vote of both houses of
the legislature. The author is critical of the decision in ·colak Nath
v. Punjab,0 in which the Indian Supreme Coµ.rt held that any amendment impinging upon fundamental rights must be enacted in the
same way that the original Constitution was enacted, namely, by a
constituent assembly, rather than by the regular amendment process
expressly provided for in the Constitution. In Dr. Basu's view, this
decision is clearly ·wrong. He makes the point, and I think correctly,
that when a constitution prescribes its own procedure for amendment,
this procedure governs, and courts are not competent either to challenge it or to insist on other methods; certainly they should not find
8. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
9, [1967] 2 India S. Ct. 762, All India R. 1967 S. Ct. 1643.
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some implicit limitation on the amendment process over and above
that stated in the constitution. This chapter is in itself very helpful
and illuminating, and it deserves wide reading.
In this volume, rich in its scholarship and understanding, Dr.
Basu has made a highly valuable contribution to the literature dealing with limited government and judicial review. It should take its
place with other comparative treatments of these matters. 1 For the
uninitiated, it is an excellent introduction to Indian constitutionalism and the role of the Indian Supreme Court in exercising its power
of review. Any treatment of these questions is of special interest to
American lawyers, jurists, and scholars, since the subject of judicial
review and the role of the United States Supreme Court, whether
activist or nonactivist, continues to be a matter of debate and discussion. Dr. Basu makes no new arguments in defense of judicial review,
and some American students of the subject, while accepting his conclusion, may not accept all of his premises. But he presents a persuasive case and does so with conviction and enthusiasm. After long
experience, Americans have become alive to the perils of judicial
review and the danger that a court carried away by its own zeal may
assume a superlegislative role and intrude into areas reserved for determination by the elected legislature and the people themselves.
American readers may not, therefore, completely share Dr. Basu's
strong support of a vigorous exercise of the judicial review power,
but it should be noted that the Supreme Court of India faced the
problem of developing a sense of confidence and resoluteness in exercising a power that was expressly given to it. Scholars like Dr. Basu
perform a great service in bringing the support of history, philosophy, and the experience of other countries to the defense of judicial
review and in urging a vigorous use of that power. One gets the impression that Dr. Basu feels that the Supreme Court of India has
come a long way in discharging the function with which it was entrusted and that, on the whole, it has charted a good course. Nevertheless, the Court is vulnerable in some of its interpretations, and
Dr. Basu is expert in probing the Court's decisions and in pointing
out what he regards as errors and weaknesses.
Dr. Basu has earned a place as the foremost scholar in Indian constitutional law. In this volume he enhances this reputation and
emerges also as a distinguished comparative scholar.

°
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Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law,
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10. E.g., M. CAPPELLEITI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CoNTEl\lPORARY WORLD (1971),
reviewed by this reviewer in 70 MICH, L. REv. 987 (1972); E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL RE•
vmw (4th ed. 1969); Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative Survey of Present
ln.<titutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250 (1966).

